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“Primitive Accumulation and 'Progress' in Southeast Asia: 
Diverse Legacies of a Common(s) Tragedy” 
 
John T. Sidel 
 
 
No one has done more over the years to draw scholarly attention to the 
immediate impact and long-term consequences of what Marx termed ‘primitive 
accumulation’ in Southeast Asia than James C. Scott, beginning with his early work 
on patron-client relations, continuing with his 1976 classic Moral Economy of the 
Peasant, and seen even in his most recent page-turner, The Art of Not Being 
Governed. While in these works (as elsewhere) Scott takes issue with many aspects of 
Marxism and tends to favor a Polanyian approach to ‘the great transformation’ of 
Southeast Asia, his account of rural dispossession in the region in the late colonial era 
clearly draws inspiration from Marx’s notion of ‘primitive accumulation’. As Scott 
argues in the introduction to The Moral Economy of the Peasant: 
Two major transformations during the colonial period in Southeast Asia 
served to undermine radically the preexisting social insurance patterns and to 
violate the moral economy of the subsistence ethic. These were, first, the 
imposition of what Eric Wolf has called “a particular cultural system, that of 
North Atlantic capitalism” and, second, the related development of the modern 
state under a colonial aegis. The transformation of land and labor (that is, 
nature and human work) into commodities for sale had the most profound 
impact. Control of land increasingly passed out of the hands of villagers; 
cultivators progressively lost free usufruct rights and became tenants or 
agrarian wage laborers; the value of what was produced was increasingly 
gauged by the fluctuations of an impersonal market. In a sense, what was 
happening in Southeast Asia was nothing more than a parochial 
recapitulation of what Marx had observed in Europe. “But on the other hand, 
these new freedmen became sellers of themselves only after they had been 
robbed of all their own means of production and of all the guarantees of 
existence afforded by the old feudal arrangements. And the history of this, 
their expropriation, is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and 
fire.”1 
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Over the past few decades, scholars have, however obliquely and un-self-
consciously, followed Scott in acknowledging the importance of primitive 
accumulation by highlighting the lingering legacies of state and class formation on 
contemporary politics in Southeast Asia. Indeed, it is by now a commonplace to note 
the importance of ‘colonial legacies’ for determining the parameters of politics in 
countries ranging from Burma to Malaysia and the Philippines, and to use such 
‘colonial legacies’ as the basis for cross-national comparative analysis within the 
region. But these exercises in comparative historical sociology have been almost 
exclusively ‘top-down’ in approach and emphasis, focusing on the identities and 
interests of ruling classes and the institutional contexts within which domination, 
exploitation, and accumulation unfold across Southeast Asia today.2 
This essay, by contrast, takes as its starting point the varying experiences of 
primitive accumulation by the subaltern classes of the region.  Primitive accumulation 
in Southeast Asia, the essay shows, unfolded under different circumstances in 
different parts of the region, and with differential impacts on and implications for 
those Southeast Asians who found themselves dispossessed and dislodged from direct 
access to the means of production, and who faced expropriation and the imposition of 
new forms of exploitation and domination under conditions of private property, wage 
labor, and the operations of a market economy. Focusing on the cases of Java, the 
Malay Peninsula, the Philippine archipelago, and the major river deltas of Mainland 
Southeast Asia, this essay suggests the possibilities for a new comparative historical 
sociology of working-class formation across the region, informed and inspired by the 
‘worm’s-eye view’ opened up by the work of Jim Scott. The diverging experiences of 
primitive accumulation among Southeast Asia’s subaltern classes, it is argued, have in 
crucial ways shaped the variegated political trajectories of the diverse countries of the 
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region for many decades, thus reaffirming Scott’s call for an approach to the study of 
politics ‘from below’, paying close attention to moral economies, peasant rebellions, 
and forms of contestation and resistance which otherwise remain hidden from view.  
 
Primitive Accumulation as Point of Departure 
 
Why should scholars working on the 21st-century politics of urbanizing, 
industrializing Southeast Asia direct their attention to ‘primitive accumulation’ in the 
rural areas of the region over the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries? Up 
into the early centuries of the second millennium of the so-called Common Era, both 
the inland agrarian states and the port polities of Southeast Asia depended for their 
emergence, entrenchment, and endurance upon the capture of labor and produce from 
their hinterlands. But the highly restricted nature of control over commodity flows 
and manpower made for attenuated and at times ephemeral forms of surplus 
extraction and state formation, with contestation and flux characterizing politics 
across the region. Over the course of the early modern era (c. 1350-1850), ‘early 
globalization’ and the ‘military revolution’ combined to enable greater centralization 
and consolidation of rule, especially in Mainland Southeast Asia, through the 
extension and intensification of domination and exploitation by ‘exemplary centers’ 
over their hinterlands.3 Thus the very basis of political order in Southeast Asia can be 
traced back to processes of what we might term ‘primitive political accumulation’. 
Arguably early post-independence ‘nation-building’ and ‘national integration’ can be 
understood as a more recent version of the same kind of transformation.4 Even today, 
we can appreciate the twin imperatives of surplus extraction and social control which 
face states as they ‘see’ their hinterlands from various Southeast Asian capitals.  
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But beyond successive instances of ‘political accumulation’, something 
arguably more important and irrevocable began to unfold across key regions of 
Southeast Asia over the course of the mid-late nineteenth century and the first decades 
of the twentieth century. Here what Karl Polanyi termed ‘the Great Transformation’ 
and Barrington Moore, Jr. glossed as the ‘commercialization of agriculture’ can also 
be understood in the language of Karl Marx as ‘primitive accumulation’. This process 
of expropriation of the means of production was famously depicted by Marx as 
having been “accomplished by means of the most merciless barbarianism, and under 
the stimulus of the most infamous, the most sordid, the most petty and the most 
odious of passions.”5 But beyond this moral condemnation, Marx also identified 
primitive accumulation as an historical necessity for the emergence and evolution of 
capitalism as a mode of production. For capitalist relations to reproduce themselves 
through the ‘silent compulsion’ of the market, a preceding phase of ‘primitive 
accumulation’ was required to commodify land and labor, and to create a ‘reserve 
army’ of ‘surplus labor’. Such a process of dispossession required direct application 
of coercion and violence, reflecting  
the pretensions of capital in its embryonic state, in its state of becoming, when 
it cannot yet use the sheer force of economic relations to secure its right to 
absorb a sufficient quantity of surplus labor, but must be aided by the power of 
the state….Centuries are required before the ‘free’ worker, owing to the 
greater development of the capitalist mode of production, makes a voluntary 
agreement, i.e. is compelled by social conditions to sell the whole of his active 
life.6 
 
The advance of capitalist production develops a working class which by 
education, tradition and habit looks upon the requirements of that mode of 
production as self-evident natural laws. The organization of the capitalist 
process of production, once it is fully developed, breaks down all resistance. 
The constant generation of a relative surplus population keeps the law of the 
supply and demand of labor, and therefore wages, within narrow limits which 
correspond to capital’s valorization requirements. The silent compulsion of 
economic relations sets the seal on the domination of the capitalist over the 
worker. Direct extra-economic force is still of course used, but only in 
exceptional cases. In the ordinary run of things, the worker can be left to the 
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‘natural laws of production,’ i.e. it is possible to rely on his dependence on 
capital, which springs from the conditions of production themselves, and is 
guaranteed in perpetuity by them. It is otherwise during the historical genesis 
of capitalist production. The rising bourgeoisie needs the power of the state, 
and uses it to ‘regulate’ wages, i.e. to force them into the limits suitable to 
make a profit, to lengthen the working day, and to keep the worker himself at 
his normal level of dependence. This is an essential aspect of so-called 
primitive accumulation.7  
 
Thus, the period of primitive accumulation was one which required active 
intervention and innovation through modern state structures and forms of what 
Foucault called discipline, through “the establishment of an explicit, coded and 
formally egalitarian juridical framework,” and “the development and generalization of 
disciplinary mechanisms” – “tiny, everyday, physical mechanisms” – of “micro-
power.”8 In other words, primitive accumulation in Marx’s sense of the term was 
inherently wrapped up in the formation of modern states and in the making of other 
forms of modern disciplinary power.  
 For much of Southeast Asia, the most important phase of primitive 
accumulation unfolded over the course of the late nineteenth century and into the first 
decades of the twentieth century. Economic and social historians have chronicled 
these developments as part of the deepening integration of Southeast Asia into the 
world capitalist economy, and the elaboration and expansion of ‘commodity chains’ 
linking peasants through credit, marketing, and processing to the key port cities of the 
region and to global circuitries of commerce beyond. Since John Furnivall’s tragi-
comic account of ‘The Fashioning of Leviathan,’ moreover, historians have also 
shown how this Great Transformation was enabled and impelled by the construction 
of the modern – typically colonial – state structures which could impose ‘free trade’, 
create and enforce new kinds of property rights, and oversee the making of ‘market 
societies’ across the region. 9Small wonder, as Furnivall noted, that there was such a 
close correspondence between areas of intensive ‘direct’ colonial rule on the one 
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hand, and those zones of Southeast Asia where market forces were most fully 
developed.10 Thus we can date the onset of primitive accumulation in Southeast Asia 
to the end of the Java War and the imposition of the Cultivation System in 1830, the 
liberalization of Philippine trade in the 1840s, the Second Anglo-Burmese War in 
1852, the signing of the Bowring Treaty of 1855 in Siam, the consolidation of French 
rule in Cochinchina in the 1860s, and the extension of British and French rule to 
Upper Burma, the Malay States, Annam, and Tonkin in the 1870s and the 1880s. The 
processes of primitive accumulation unleashed during these decades expanded and 
accelerated through the first decades of the twentieth century, setting the stage for 
capitalist development in Southeast Asia in the post-war era of independence. While 
Southeast Asians had been producing goods for markets and participating in the world 
economy for centuries, it was only through primitive accumulation in the mid-late 19th 
and early 20th centuries that the region was reordered along the lines of a ‘market 
society’, with increasingly densely populated core zones organized around intensively 
commercialized agricultural production.  
 But if primitive accumulation can be glossed in such broad-brush terms, how 
might it help us to understand patterns of politics in Southeast Asia – and to explain 
differences across the region – today?  If primitive accumulation was ‘of a piece’ in 
Southeast Asia, if its outcome was inevitable, then its consequences would have been 
uniform across the region. But scholars have highlighted the lasting legacies of 
differences in the ways in which primitive accumulation unfolded for the formation of 
classes and states in other parts of the world, most obviously Europe and Latin 
America.11 Scholars of Southeast Asia have likewise stressed the enduring 
significance of the diverging patterns of assimilation and segregation experienced by 
the immigrant Chinese merchant communities who played such an important role in 
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the accumulation of capital and the formation of capitalist classes across the region.12 
In this sense, we already know that the modalities of primitive accumulation ‘matter’. 
 But, as noted above, the work of James C. Scott has suggested a very different 
vantage point from which to evaluate the varying contexts, forms, and consequences 
of primitive accumulation across Southeast Asia. Here, whether we celebrate 
primitive accumulation as ‘progress’, condemn it as ‘barbarism’, or accept it as 
‘historical necessity’, we might heed Scott’s advice and his example. Looking not just 
‘from above’ but ‘from below’, seeing not just ‘like a state’ but also like a peasant, we 
should not assume the inevitable triumph of the capitalist market and the seamless 
hegemony of capitalist classes. Instead, we should examine the dialectical 
significance of the myriad forms of Polanyian ‘counter-movement’ and Schweikian 
foot-dragging and resistance engendered by primitive accumulation. If primitive 
accumulation was necessary for the making of capitalist production relations, the 
formation of capitalist classes and working classes, and the construction of modern 
nation-states across Southeast Asia, then variations in the circumstances and 
processes of primitive accumulation in the region must be foundational and 
fundamental in many ways. Thus the pages below suggest how we might begin to 
explore this line of inquiry. 
 
Primitive Accumulation in Mainland River Deltas: Siam and its Two Twins? 
 
An easy and obvious initial illustration of this kind of analysis is presented by 
the cases of the three major river deltas of Mainland Southeast Asia, where primitive 
accumulation began to unfold and accelerate in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century. In the Mekong, Chao Phraya, and Irrawaddy river deltas, this development 
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arose and evolved through the dramatic growth of the rice trade, as the volume of rice 
exported increased by 500% between the early 1860s and the early 1900s. Facilitated 
by the imposition of ‘free trade’ in Siam under the Bowring Treaty of 1855 and the 
establishment of direct colonial rule under British and French auspices in Lower 
Burma and Cochinchina over the 1850s and 1860s, this boom in the rice trade 
stimulated a massive wave of land clearance and settlement. If historians estimate that 
the total area devoted to rice cultivation in Mainland Southeast Asia in 1850 was 
under six million acres, by World War I, over 21 million acres were planted to rice, 
15 million of which were located in the Chao Phraya, Irrawaddy, and Mekong river 
deltas.  The same period was likewise characterized by dramatic population growth in 
these three zones of rice cultivation for export, with numbers said to have at least 
tripled from 1830 to 1910. These trends continued and deepened in subsequent 
decades. Between the turn of the twentieth century and World War II, the area planted 
to rice doubled in Lower Burma, the Central Thai Plain, and Cochinchina. Overall, 
with the onset of primitive accumulation in these three zones of intensive rice 
cultivation for export, the commodification of land, produce, and labor began to 
unfold and accelerate, even as demographic pressures started to build up and to bear 
more and more heavily upon Vietnamese, Burmese, and Thai peasants, as seen in the 
inexorable fall in average farm size, stagnation or decline in rice yields, and a 
consequent rise in indebtedness and landlessness over the years. With the successful 
commodification of land, labor, and produce, a ‘reserve army’ of ‘surplus labor’ was 
being conscripted for service.13  
But against the backdrop of these common trends, important divergences in 
the contexts, experiences, and consequences of primitive accumulation are also 
worthy of note. Most obvious in this regard is the distinctiveness of the Chao Phraya 
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River Delta and the Central Thai Plain as a zone of increasingly intensive 
commercialized rice cultivation. In contrast with the Irrawaddy and Mekong river 
deltas, this area of settlement and agricultural production was located not in a frontier 
zone, but within the core realms of the Chakkri dynasty. Unlike Lower Burma and 
Cochinchina, moreover, the Central Thai Plain saw the accumulation of capital – and 
land – by immigrant ‘Chinese’ moneylenders, rice millers, and rice traders who were 
assimilated into native society rather than segregated and stigmatized as ‘foreign’. 
Relative to the British and French colonial regimes in Burma and Indochina, 
moreover, the Chakkri dynasty in Siam, restricted as it was by the terms of the 
Bowring Treaty of 1855, did not impose, enforce, or intensify onerous tax burdens on 
its peasant population in such ways as to accelerate population growth and expansion 
of cultivation or to induce ‘agricultural involution’ and immiseration among an 
increasingly indebted and landless class of rural laborers. 
 Instead, the experience of primitive accumulation among the peasants of the 
Central Thai Plain was relatively – perhaps even markedly – less disruptive, 
degrading, and demoralizing than it was for their counterparts in Lower Burma and 
Cochinchina. Thai peasants gradually shifted into production of more and more rice 
on more and more land for distant markets, while existing structures of authority 
adapted to this Great Transformation and incorporated a capital-owning class within 
the ranks of Thai society. In contrast with the hardships – and the rebellions! – of the 
Depression years in Burma and Vietnam, the 1930s were relatively unremarkable and 
unthreatening to peasant subsistence and social order alike in rural Thailand, the 
changes underway in Bangkok notwithstanding. Small wonder: if the land frontiers of 
the Irrawaddy and Mekong deltas were already closing in the first few decades of the 
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twentieth century, the expansion of rice cultivation continued well into the postwar 
era in Thailand.14  
 It is against this backdrop of primitive accumulation across the three main 
river delta zones of Mainland Southeast Asia that we can best understand the 
distinctiveness of Thailand’s  trajectory over the course of the past several decades 
and up to the present. Beyond the much debated ‘mixed blessing’ of Siam’s 
avoidance of direct colonization, the distinctive experience of primitive accumulation 
left important legacies of its own. The modern Thai state and the (Sino-)Thai 
capitalist class, after all, emerged in the postwar era as inheritors to an increasingly 
dense and productive core zone of settlement and surplus generation in which the 
relatively slow, easy, gradual process of primitive accumulation, the continuities with 
pre-capitalist structures of authority, and the assimilation of immigrant comprador 
capitalists made for the appearance of conservatism, quiescence, and the notable 
absence of large-scale organization and mobilization among the peasantry.  
Thus the Central Thai Plain emerged as the economic, cultural, linguistic, and 
political core of ‘Thailand’ without the dramatic disruptions, difficulties, and 
departures experienced by the peasants of Vietnam and Burma. While Communist-led 
revolution, land reform, and collectivization proceeded with varying success to 
‘capture’ the increasingly immiserated and proletarianized peasantry of Tonkin, 
Annam, and Cochinchina, and as land reform, nationalization, and forced expulsion of 
the immigrant Indian capitalist class were undertaken in efforts to win control over 
the peasants of Burma, the ‘bureaucratic polity’ based in Bangkok proceeded in the 
1950s, 1960s, and 1970s to ‘liberalize’ land laws to eliminate remaining obstacles to 
land acquisition, sale, and transfer. In the face of Communist victories in Vietnam, 
Laos, and Cambodia, and mobilizational efforts by the Communist Party of Thailand 
 11 
and left-wing student activists in the 1970s, the response was to reaffirm and reassert 
the highly conservative premises of the status quo.15  
It was thus in the context of the preceding history of primitive accumulation 
and the easy defeat and demobilization of rural activism, especially on the Central 
Thai Plain, that the parliamentarization of Thai politics proceeded from the early 
1980s onwards. Left-wing activists were amnestied and easily incorporated into 
mainstream Thai society,16 and over time, with few hiccups, power was shifted into 
the hands of a Parliament whose members overwhelmingly represented rural districts 
in principle but essentially represented provincial business and Bangkok banking 
interests in practice.17 Stubborn resistance to the parliamentarization of the 
‘bureaucratic polity’ has been fairly matched – and seemingly overcome – by the 
expansion of direct appeals to the rural electorate, not on the basis of land reform or 
social redistribution, but through the extension of state patronage and subsistence 
protection to the peasantry.18  
All in all, the pattern of primitive accumulation across the three main river 
deltas of Mainland Southeast Asia prefigured important differences in the subsequent 
political trajectories of Burma, Vietnam, and Thailand. The disruptions and 
difficulties of primitive accumulation helped to enable and inspire forms of rural 
mobilization, peasant revolution, and then nationalization, land reform, and 
collectivization under different kinds of state socialist auspices and experiments in 
Burma and Vietnam. Meanwhile, a more conservative path to capitalist development 
and parliamentary democracy was prefigured by the relatively slow and easy form of 
primitive accumulation in Thailand.  
 
 12 
Primitive Accumulation in the Islands: Java, the Malay Peninsula, and the Philippines
  
 If we turn to the cases of Java, the Malay Peninsula, and the Philippines, 
moreover, we can see additional evidence of the lasting significance of primitive 
accumulation across island Southeast Asia. Here perhaps the conservatism of the Thai 
path to capitalist development and parliamentary democracy is in some ways mirrored 
in the case of the Malay Peninsula, where primitive accumulation over the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries unfolded with famously ‘protective’ policies towards the 
Malay peasantry and heavy reliance on immigrant labor instead. While immigrant 
Chinese tin miners and, to a lesser extent, Indian rubber plantation laborers provided 
the basis for large-scale working-class mobilization unparalleled in Siam and 
Thailand, the ‘protected’ Malay peasantry served throughout the twentieth century as 
a conservative counterpart to the rice farmers of the Central Thai Plain.19 Actively 
discouraged from shifting into commercialized agriculture, ‘protected’ on specially 
‘reserved’ lands, and increasingly governed by state-based interpretations of Islam, 
the Malay peasantry provided a ‘locked-in electorate’ for the (reinvented) Malay 
aristocracy as it restyled itself as UMNO under parliamentary auspices in the 1950s 
and 1960s, much as Thai peasants provided a ready-made mass base for the chao pho 
of the 1980s and 1990s. From the 1970s, the New Economic Policy created new, 
more centralized patronage mechanisms to incorporate this electoral base into a now 
decidedly business-oriented UMNO machine, arguably in ways foreshadowing the 
analogous innovations introduced by Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand at the turn of 
the twenty-first century.  
 But if this pattern of primitive accumulation has made Malaysia – for better 
and for worse – the Thailand of island Southeast Asia, what about the Indonesian and 
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Philippine archipelagos next door? Here the Philippine case suggests itself as a 
seemingly similar, but in striking ways diverging, pattern of primitive accumulation in 
comparison with the Central Thai Plain and the Malay Peninsula. In geographical 
terms, after all, the Philippine archipelago experienced the first waves of primitive 
accumulation over the latter half of the nineteenth century simultaneously with the 
river deltas of Mainland Southeast Asia, but with incorporation into the world 
capitalist economy speeding marketization in the separate hinterlands of a number of 
only loosely connected port cities. Alongside Manila with its hinterlands in Central 
Luzon and the southern Tagalog region, other key entrepôt cities like Cebu and Iloilo 
served as hubs for the marketization of land and labor in the Central and Western 
Visayas in the mid-nineteenth century, with other such ports across areas of Luzon, 
Bicol, the Visayas, and Mindanao emerging over subsequent decades. Thus the 
pattern of primitive accumulation across the Philippines prefigured an especially 
‘uneven’ form of development, with the timing, the institutional context, the specific 
commodity chains, and the consequences destined to differ markedly from one part of 
the archipelago to the next.20  
 Beyond the implications of archipelagic geography, moreover, the Philippine 
path of primitive accumulation was also distinctive in terms of the institutional 
auspices under which it unfolded and the implications for capital accumulation, on the 
one hand, and class relations, on the other. As in Siam, the immigrant ‘Chinese’ 
merchants and moneylenders who fanned out from the various port cities of the 
Philippine archipelago to purchase – and process -- agricultural commodities, sell 
foreign manufactured goods, extend credit, and acquire land were allowed to 
assimilate into native society, as the children of their unions with native women 
(indias) were treated as mestizos and freed from the restrictions of their chino fathers. 
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Thus the latter half of the nineteenth century saw the rise to local prominence – and, 
as cabezas de barangay and gobernadorcillos, local elected state office – of Chinese 
mestizo merchants and landowners. Unlike in Siam, however, the imposition of 
American rule at the turn of the twentieth century saw not the elaboration of a 
centralized ‘bureaucratic polity’ as in Siam and later Thailand, but rather a highly 
decentralized form of oligarchical democracy, with suffrage expanding from 14% of 
the population to universal suffrage by Independence in 1946.  
 Thus as primitive accumulation spread from the established areas of 
settlement and commercialized agriculture of the late Spanish colonial era to 
incorporate the full breadth of the Philippine archipelago, it did so under the auspices 
of a state subordinated to the logic of electoral competition. The consequences were 
decisive. From the very first years of the twentieth century, capital accumulation 
unfolded in a context in which state resources and regulatory powers were captured 
by locally elected mayors, governors, and congressmen, prefiguring a close fusion of 
political and economic success. Some 92% of the area of the archipelago was 
designated as public land for lease or sale by the Bureau of Lands in the early decades 
of the twentieth century; political influence strongly shaped the subsequent auction of 
the ‘friar estates’, and the awarding of logging and mining concessions and pasture 
lease agreements for the decades that followed. Congressional control over the 
Philippine National Bank (created in 1916) enabled powerful sugar planters to finance 
the construction of dozens of sugar mills across the country in the 1920s and 1930s 
and thereby to expand their landholdings considerably in subsequent years. Support 
for import-substitution industrialization in the 1950s and 1960s by the Development 
Bank of the Philippines likewise allowed entrenched politicians to finance the 
construction of cement plants and textile factories, even as early postwar protection 
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for the tobacco industry and later quasi-state monopolies and monopsonies for sugar 
and coconuts intertwined political networks with key agricultural commodity chains 
across the archipelago. The electoralization of state power in the Philippines as 
primitive accumulation unfolded not only prefigured ‘crony capitalism’ on a grand 
scale as seen in the Marcos era, but also burdened the everyday workings of the 
market economy with myriad forms of monopolies and monopsonies, oligopolies and 
oligopsonies. A study in the 1950s, for instance, revealed that municipal-level 
restrictions greatly inflated the price of ice in localities across the Philippines, and this 
example is only the tip of the proverbial iceberg.21 
 At the same time, the intertwining of primitive accumulation with electoral 
competition for access to state power also decisively shaped class relations in the 
Philippines throughout the twentieth century and arguably beyond. Primitive 
accumulation in this form obviously facilitated the emergence and entrenchment of 
enduring forms of fused local economic and political power, often in dynastic form, in 
localities across the Philippines.22 But this kind of localized, electoralized primitive 
accumulation entailed not only accumulation of land, capital, and access to scarce 
resources, but also accumulation of control over voters, whether understood as 
‘clients’ or as ‘locked-in electorates’ instead. Both accumulation, on the one hand, 
and dispossession, on the other, have thus been colored by highly parochial, personal, 
particularistic, and partisan considerations. Resentment and resistance, and prospects 
for large-scale mobilization, in the face of dispossession have thus been inexorably 
drawn into the logic of electoral competition for access to state power. Small wonder 
that it was only under the long years of the centralized Marcos dictatorship that the 
threat of peasant revolution could be credibly mounted across the diverse terrain of 
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the Philippine archipelago, and even then with great unevenness across different 
regions and crop zones as well.  
Thus overall, the Philippines’ electoralized form of primitive accumulation 
has in various ways complicated, compromised, and constrained capitalist 
development in the country, diminishing the dynamism of its market economy and 
deepening economic and social inequalities beyond those observed elsewhere in the 
region. This form of primitive accumulation has likewise condemned the Philippines 
to a decidedly oligarchical form of democracy, with counterhegemonic challenges to 
the status quo surfacing in a cyclical pattern of crises and ‘transformist’ 
reequilibration, what Gramsci called a ‘passive revolution’ in which pressures for 
change are effectively sublimated and suppressed. Hence the far less rosy picture of 
capitalist development and democratization in the Philippines as compared with 
Thailand.23 
 Finally, if we turn to the pattern of primitive accumulation which crystallized 
on Java and parts of Sumatra over the nineteenth century, we find an especially 
complex set of distinctive and significant legacies still haunting Indonesia today. 
Here, three distinctive features of primitive accumulation in the Indonesian 
archipelago are especially worthy of note. First of all, as is well known, the 
commodification of land and labor on Java and elsewhere unfolded in considerable 
measure through forms of market mediation largely controlled by immigrant 
merchants whose ‘Chinese’ ancestry served as the basis for segregation and 
stigmatization as ‘foreign’, in contrast with the processes of assimilation and 
integration observed in Siam and the Philippines. As the Javanese aristocracy – and 
its ‘native’ counterparts elsewhere in the archipelago – remained at one arm’s length 
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from the workings of the market, capital accumulation thus remained problematically 
‘foreign’ in ways virtually unparalleled elsewhere in Southeast Asia.24  
Secondly,  more than any other colony in Southeast Asia, the administration of 
the Netherlands East Indies depended heavily on the strengthening of village 
institutions, which were understood by Dutch officials to have enjoyed considerable 
‘traditional’ depth and strength, and were consequently relied upon, reinforced, and 
reinvented as the bases for political control and economic extraction.25 Over the 
course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, moreover, Dutch colonial 
scholars of ‘customary’ or adat law, most notably those coming out of the adatrecht 
school in Leiden, began to systematize adat law and reified adat institutions, so that 
through the ‘invention of tradition’ a desa adat or customary village emerged as a 
supposedly “autonomous, corporate village community – the ideal-type 
dorpsrepubliek.”26 Thus revisionist scholars have concluded that “the village as a 
corporate, autonomous and territorially defined unit was in a certain sense a creation 
of intensified colonial rule in the early nineteenth century.”27  
The strength of community boundaries created by Dutch administrative 
policies was further enhanced by colonial reliance on the village as the essential unit 
for economic extraction, most notably in the clove monopoly in the Moluccas and 
under the Cultivation System of forced extractions of sugar, coffee, and other cash 
crops in Java. While some pre-colonial villages had strongly established patterns of 
communal land tenure and labor-sharing schemes,28 colonial-era villages in the 
Netherlands Indies more widely and insistently relied on communal cultivation of 
various export crops and the rotation and apportionment of land and labor at the 
village level.29 Significantly, moreover, the colonial regime erected considerable 
barriers to the alienation of land to non-villagers and left considerable landholdings in 
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the realm of village control, whether in the form of communal lands or the salary 
lands (tanah bengkok) awarded to village officials.30 In short, if the essential 
dimensions of community strength are “the mechanisms of authoritative control and 
jurisdiction of membership, the channels of discursive focus that establish a folklore 
of place, and the forms of economic cooperation that underpin membership claims to 
local subsistence,” then certainly Dutch policies created strong notions of community 
when compared to colonial-era villages elsewhere in Southeast Asia.31 Small wonder 
that beyond Sinicized Annam and Tonkin, only village Java has been designated by 
anthropologists – hyperbolically – as characterized by so-called “closed corporate 
communities.”32 
 Primitive accumulation thus unfolded under distinctly ‘communitarian’ 
auspices. Nowhere was this more true than in Java, where the state-run Cultivation 
System of the mid-nineteenth century forced the peasantry into a complex web of 
relations of production unparalleled in their intensity in Southeast Asia at the time. 
The Cultivation System awarded collective ownership of land to villages and assigned 
villagers collective responsibility for payment of land taxes (landrente). These 
obligations, as well as restrictions on mobility, tied Javanese peasants to their villages, 
which “were reorganized both to emphasize the uniform obligation of all village 
members and to facilitate supervision.”33 After the passage of the Agrarian Law of 
1870, and with the dawning of the Ethical Policy in the early 1900s, this pattern was 
preserved through contracts between Javanese villages and European estates.34 
Third and finally, primitive accumulation in the Indonesian archipelago 
unfolded in ways which forced an unusually early proletarianization of the peasantry, 
especially on Java. The deepening incorporation of the Indonesian archipelago within 
the world economy over the course of the nineteenth century entailed advanced forms 
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of exploitation in commercial agriculture, commodity processing, and natural 
resource exploitation, as well as the elaboration of a modern transportation network, 
creating a sizeable class of wage laborers. By 1900, some 435,000 hectares were 
leased out to large private estates on Java,35 and connected through sugar mills and 
railroads to port cities like Batavia, Semarang, and Surabaya, which hosted more than 
150,000 residents by the turn of the twentieth century.36  
By 1900 Java was the most technologically modern and integrated economy 
between Bengal and Japan. The technology of the Industrial Revolution had 
been applied to a network of transport and communications, to an export-
oriented sugar milling industry with giant factories commanding most of the 
best land on the island, to irrigation systems, to ancillary metal-working and 
heavy engineering industries, to the production of some urban middle-class 
consumer goods such as bread, soft drinks and ice, to construction materials 
such as bricks and timber to public utilities such as gas and power. Excluding 
the tiny urban islands of Singapore and Penang, there was nowhere else like it 
in Southeast Asia.37  
 
The construction of a modern infrastructure for intensive export-oriented agricultural 
production continued apace well into the twentieth century. By 1942, there were 1.3 
million hectares of irrigated rice fields, thousands of kilometers of asphalted, and 
metalled roads, and 5,500 kilometers of railway line on Java.38  
From the mid-nineteenth century forward, a similarly modern infrastructure 
was extended to various parts of the other islands of the Indonesian archipelago.  By 
1900, some 370,000 hectares of land outside Java were held by private estates, with 
nearly another plus another 480,000 under various kinds of concessions; by the 1920s, 
there were 500,000 hectares under concession in North Sumatra alone, with private 
estates across the entirety of the archipelago claiming nearly 3 million hectares of 
land.39 Enclaves of concentrated, and heavily capitalized, production dotted the 
landscape: a vast plantation belt along the eastern coast of Sumatra, tin mines on the 
islands of Bangka and Belitung, coal mines in West Sumatra, oil refineries in Borneo, 
 20 
and scattered mines and plantations elsewhere. Most notable was the so-called ‘Deli 
belt’ of plantations on the eastern coast of Sumatra: 
By 1930 more than 11,000 Europeans were living on the East Coast, directly 
or indirectly involved in the estate industry. For the first time, personnel, 
capital, sites of production, and processing plants drawn from, or situated in, 
different parts of the Western and colonized worlds were pulled together under 
single, but notably distinct, corporate structures.40 
 
Overall, compared to the Philippines and much of the rest of Southeast Asia at 
the turn of the twentieth century, the Netherlands East Indies was distinguished by the 
relatively early emergence of a class of wage laborers concentrated in large-scale 
agricultural production and processing and key nodes of modern transport. By 1930, 
an estimated 300,000 coolie laborers were toiling on the plantations of East Sumatra, 
and nearly 250,000 more were to be found working on large plantations and mines 
elsewhere in the Outer Islands.41 On Java, sizeable concentrations of laborers were 
likewise to be found, and not only on the plantations: historians have estimated that 
industrial workers numbered nearly 250,000 by 1942, with an additional 50,000 
laboring on the railways, and many thousands more in the harbors of Batavia, 
Semarang, and Surabaya, and on the steamboats plying interisland and international 
routes from these ports.42  
These distinctive features of primitive accumulation as it unfolded in the 
Netherlands East Indies have had enduring consequences for capitalist development 
and political change in Indonesia. Aside from Tonkin, with its own history of 
agricultural involution, immiseration, and early ‘export’ of proletarianized peasant 
labor, nowhere else in Southeast Asia has seen such a history of collective action, 
mass mobilization, and popular radicalism as that witnessed on Java and in other 
areas of the Indonesian archipelago.43 In the Sarekat Islam of the 1910s and early 
1920s, Southeast Asia saw its first large-scale mass popular movement, unparalleled 
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in extent elsewhere in the region, and in the Partai Komunis Indonesia, we likewise 
find the first Communist Party in Asia.44 In the Revolusi of the early postwar era, we 
can observe a struggle for independence notable for the intensity and diversity of 
autonomous local popular mobilization, including many local ‘social revolutions’ 
across areas of Java and Sumatra, and in the early aftermath of Independence, we see 
political parties more diverse and collectivist in their identities and forms of voter 
mobilization than found anywhere else in Southeast Asia.45  
Against this backdrop, capitalist development and political order in Indonesia 
have assumed distinctive forms. It was only through considerable state violence that 
demobilization of the popular classes could be effected by the Suharto regime, and it 
was against the abiding threat of popular mobilization that a very elaborately and 
intensively institutionalized form of authoritarian rule was constructed across the full 
breadth of the Indonesian archipelago. Even as the Indonesian economy moved 
through import-substitution industrialization under an oil boom into export-oriented 
industrialization, moreover, it retained important features of capital accumulation and 
class relations from the colonial era of primitive accumulation. The ‘foreign’ ancestry 
of the dominant segment of the capitalist class in the archipelago remained 
problematic, enabling and impelling a succession of experiments with economic 
‘nationalism’ and encouraging forms of state intervention and ownership stubbornly 
resistant to pressures for economic liberalization, deregulation, and privatization.46 
Even as Indonesia shifted from centralized authoritarian rule to decentralized 
democracy at the turn of the twenty-first century, these legacies continued to shape 
the patterns of capitalist development and political change across the archipelago in a 
variety of ways. 
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Conclusions: James C. Scott and Comparative Analysis of Primitive Accumulation 
 
 As the pages above have suggested, a comparative analysis of primitive 
accumulation provides a potentially illuminating vantage point from which to 
understand – and to explain – key patterns of divergence in the trajectories of 
Southeast Asian countries, both in terms of capitalist development and political 
change. The preceding analysis has remained largely suggestive and limited in detail 
with regard to the tracing of causal linkages, and thus remains vulnerable to charges 
of superficiality and oversimplification. But at the very least, this essay has offered a 
set of new arguments with regard to the significance of otherwise neglected agrarian 
determinants of the modern economic and political trajectories of Southeast Asia into 
the twenty-first century. It is to be hoped that further consideration of these arguments 
will be undertaken in due course. 
 At the same time, it is perhaps worth noting that the possibilities for this kind 
of comparative historical sociology of agrarian change in Southeast Asia were first 
identified but then abandoned by James C. Scott himself, as seen in the final chapter 
of The Moral Economy of the Peasant in 1976.  For this we must remain grateful, as it 
has only been through his emancipation from the iron cage of ‘the comparative 
method’ that Scott has gone on to produce such powerfully original and illuminating 
contributions to our understandings of politics in Southeast Asia and far beyond. The 
exercise in comparative analysis provided above can thus only provide a very feeble 
tribute to Scott’s work, and a highly derivative kind of argument for the continuing 
importance of aspects of politics which Scott has done more than any other scholar to 
illuminate over the years. But perhaps at least it does so in ways which might speak 
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with emphasis if not originality to a wide range of scholars interested in the 
contemporary politics of Southeast Asia. 
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